Whether a corporate officer had authority and whether he reasonably believed he had authority are different questions. Nevin Shetty's July 31, 2026 opening brief in the Ninth Circuit places that distinction at the center of its challenge to the jury instructions. The appeal argues that the jury needed guidance on both questions to evaluate the mental state required for wire fraud.
The argument does not depend on pretending the trial court excluded authorization altogether. The brief acknowledges that the court instructed jurors on actual authorization as a defense. Its complaint is more precise: the instructions did not expressly address a reasonable, though mistaken, belief that the board had authorized the investment. That additional question, counsel argues, could have mattered even if jurors rejected his interpretation of the policy.
Two routes through the same evidence
The first route concerns the company's actual delegation. Fabric adopted an investment policy through a board resolution, and the defense relied on those documents when arguing that Shetty could make the disputed investment. The earlier board-resolution exhibit supplies historical context for that position. It identifies the formal corporate action the defense considered central, without itself deciding whether a particular transfer was authorized.
The second route concerns Shetty's understanding of the delegation. A jury could conclude that a policy did not actually authorize particular conduct while still needing to decide whether the officer knowingly exceeded its limits. The appeal argues that this difference between objective scope and personal understanding was essential to the prosecution's theory of fraudulent appropriation.
That distinction gives the proposed instruction its purpose. Counsel was not asking the jury to approve the investment or disregard its consequences. The request sought an explanation of how a reasonable belief about authority related to criminal intent. It would have identified a separate issue for the jury after the parties debated the policy's meaning.
What the proposed instruction addressed
As reproduced in the opening brief, the proposed instruction connected Shetty's reasonable belief directly to the authority granted by the board resolution adopting the investment policy. It therefore identified the source of the claimed permission rather than relying on a general assertion that he thought his conduct acceptable.
The government opposed the instruction, arguing that the existing mental-state instructions adequately covered the point and that the proposal functioned too much like an assertion of innocence. According to the appeal, the district court relied on the presence of an intent element in the wire-fraud instructions when rejecting the additional language.
The disagreement was consequently about whether a general statement supplied enough guidance in this particular setting. The appeal argues that requiring an intent to deceive and cheat did not explain what happened if the jury believed Shetty misunderstood the scope of his authority. Counsel wanted the legal significance of that possible finding stated expressly.
Why a disputed interpretation could matter
Corporate documents can assign duties, prescribe investment parameters, and provide procedures for exceptions within the same policy. The appeal treats those different provisions as relevant to how a finance officer could understand his role. It does not follow that every interpretation an officer offers after a loss must be accepted. The jury would still need to evaluate the asserted belief against the evidence.
That remaining factual task is a strength of the argument for a clear instruction. Explaining the consequence of a finding does not require directing jurors to make the finding. Counsel's position would leave jurors to assess credibility and the record, while making clear why a reasonable belief about authority could be relevant to the required intent.
The wider concern about keeping federal fraud distinct from every disputed corporate decision also appears in the NACDL amicus brief filed earlier in the case. That amicus is separate advocacy, not a decision on the appeal. Its attention to statutory boundaries helps explain why the defense has repeatedly sought precision about the difference between corporate disagreement and criminal liability.
Actual authorization was already part of the charge
The appeal's acknowledgment of the authorization instruction is important. A broad claim that jurors were never allowed to consider authority would miss the issue the opening brief actually presents. Counsel argues that the instruction recognized one defense while leaving an associated mental-state defense insufficiently explained.
The brief also maintains that this gap became more important because directors testified about what authority they intended to confer. Under the defense's analysis, a jury needed to distinguish those witnesses' understanding from Shetty's understanding. Otherwise, counsel argues, disagreement with the directors could be mistaken for proof that he knowingly acted beyond his powers.
That is an appellate claim about the possible effect of the instructions. It is not an account of the jurors' private deliberations or an appellate finding that they used the wrong standard. The requested remedy is a new trial with instructions that counsel says would fully present the defense, alongside the brief's separate request for acquittal on other grounds.
A focused challenge after conviction
Shetty was convicted of four wire-fraud counts on November 7, 2025, and sentenced to two years in prison on March 5, 2026. The July 31 opening brief asks the Ninth Circuit to review that result. His public materials provide the broader personal and documentary context, while the brief identifies the particular errors his appellate lawyers allege.
The reasonable-belief argument deserves consideration on its own terms. It asks for a careful distinction between what a company authorized and what its officer understood, with the jury deciding the facts under a complete explanation of the law. That is a substantive defense position, grounded in the proposed instruction and the contested policy, rather than a request to overlook an investment's serious consequences.